Implementation and Renegotiation

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00077MaRDI QIDQ4262862zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors John Hardman Moore, Eric Maskin

Publication date 4 June 2000

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937X.00077

zbMATH Keywords

implementationmechanism designrenegotiationserial choice rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation
• Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
• Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation
• Collusion, renegotiation and implementation

Cited in

(35)

• Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
• The theory of implementation when the planner is a player
• On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems
• Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information
• Information gathering and the hold-up problem in a complete contracting framework
• Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
• Optimal delay in committees
• Bargaining power and renegotiation of small private debt contracts
• Deferred acceptance algorithm with retrade
• Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations
• Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities
• The renegotiation-proofness principle and costly renegotiation
• Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons
• Intrinsic impediments to category captainship collaboration
• Collusion, renegotiation and implementation
• When manufacturers hold information back from strong suppliers
• On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship
• Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2096844 (Why is no real title available?)
• Implementation theory
• Voluntary implementation
• Mechanism design by observant and informed planners
• Implementation in strong core by codes of rights
• Contractual solutions to hold-up problems with quality uncertainty and unobservable investments
• Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
• Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
• Direct implementation with evidence
• Evidence disclosure and verifiability
• Nash implementation and uncertain renegotiation
• Reinforcement learning for household finance: designing policy via responsiveness
• Hard evidence and mechanism design
• On robust constitution design
• Contract design and non-cooperative renegotiation
• Repeated implementation and complexity considerations
• Nash implementation without no-veto power

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