Optimal delay in committees

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.06.008MaRDI QIDQ2049494zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ettore Damiano, Hao Li, Wing Suen

Publication date 25 August 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.06.008

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic delay mechanismlocalized variations methodstart-and-stop

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Decision theory (91B06)

Recommendations

• Deliberating Collective Decisions
• Optimal deadlines for agreements
• Search by committee
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information
• Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1

Cites work

• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Bargaining with Interdependent Values
• Bargaining with common values
• Contract, Mechanism Design, and Technological Detail
• Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case
• Implementation and Renegotiation
• Mechanism design with renegotiation and costly messages
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Optimal allocation without transfer payments
• Optimal deadlines for agreements
• Optimal limited authority for principal
• Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
• Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect
• Posterior efficiency
• Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms1
• Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation
• The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)
• The War of Attrition in Continuous Time with Complete Information
• The deadline effect
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• What money can't buy: efficient mechanism design with costly signals

Cited in

(4)

• Time delay and the extraction of information rent in regulation
• Coordination through committees and markets with option timing games
• Free riding on successors, delay, and extremism
• Optimal reform postponement

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