Free riding on successors, delay, and extremism

DOI10.1007/S00355-017-1043-YMaRDI QIDQ1704057zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Amihai Glazer, Stef Proost

Publication date 8 March 2018

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-017-1043-y

zbMATH Keywords

action postponement to successorincumbent action delay

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Recommendations

• Private agenda and re-election incentives
• Optimal delay in committees
• Policy inertia, election uncertainty, and incumbency disadvantage of political parties
• Endogenous institutions and political extremism
• Optimal reform postponement

Cites work

• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Political competition, policy and growth: theory and evidence from the US

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