Joint Projects without Commitment
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(60)- Starting small and renegotiation
- Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
- Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents.
- A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment.
- Shipwrecks and treasure hunters
- Free riding on successors, delay, and extremism
- Economics of open source technology: a dynamic approach
- On the endogeneity of Cournot--Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation
- The production and cost-sharing of an excludable public good
- Dynamic coordination games
- Credit attribution and collaborative work
- Early refund bonuses increase successful crowdfunding
- A model of gradual information disclosure
- Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players
- Contribution games with asymmetric agents
- Symmetric equilibria in a cost-averting war of attrition requiring minimum necessary conceders
- Should the talk be cheap in contribution games?
- Payment schemes for sustaining cooperation in dynamic games
- Search without looking
- Cooperation in a dynamic setting with asymmetric environmental valuation and responsibility
- Promises and endogenous reneging costs
- Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game
- Split it up to create incentives: investment, public goods and crossing the river
- Coordination need not be a problem
- A revision game of experimentation on a common threshold
- Auctioning a discrete public good under incomplete information
- Coordination and delay in global games
- Bargaining with history-dependent preferences
- Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
- Voluntary contributions by consent or dissent
- Observation delays in teams and effort cycles
- Deriving consensus in multiagent systems
- Pledge-and-review bargaining
- Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination
- Technology transfers for climate change
- Duplicative search
- Finite horizon game for voluntary provision of a discrete public good
- WAGE NEGOTIATION UNDER GOOD FAITH BARGAINING
- Dynamic legislative decision making when interest groups control the agenda
- Noncooperative dynamic contribution to a public project
- On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information
- Private provision of discrete public goods with incomplete information
- Quid pro quo: Friendly information exchange between rivals
- Optimal sequential contests
- Strategic exits in stochastic partnerships: the curse of profitability
- Eradicating common populations of invasive species involves balancing efficiency and fairness
- The economics of career concerns in teamwork
- Monotone games with positive spillovers
- Valuation asymmetry in the dynamic private provision of public goods
- Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion
- Network architecture, salience and coordination
- Hold-up in the absence of individual rationality: asymptotic efficiency and gradualism
- Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment
- Infinite horizon common interest games with perfect information
- Arbitration systems and negotiations
- Multilateral bargaining with concession costs
- Failure of gradualism under imperfect monitoring
- Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game
- Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data
- Overcoming the coordination problem: dynamic formation of networks
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