Bargaining with history-dependent preferences
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Publication:2455681
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.004zbMath1281.91092MaRDI QIDQ2455681
Publication date: 26 October 2007
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.004
91A05: 2-person games
91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models
91A25: Dynamic games
91B08: Individual preferences
Related Items
Truncated leximin solutions, Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments, Repeated bargaining with reference-dependent preferences, Bargaining with revoking costs, Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion, Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment, Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence, Commitment in alternating offers bargaining, Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity, Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining, Subgame perfect equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game with loss aversion, WAGE NEGOTIATION UNDER GOOD FAITH BARGAINING
Cites Work
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- Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games