Bargaining with history-dependent preferences

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.004zbMath1281.91092MaRDI QIDQ2455681

Duozhe Li

Publication date: 26 October 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.10.004

zbMATH Keywords

delay; bargaining; history-dependence; gradualism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A05: 2-person games

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

91A25: Dynamic games

91B08: Individual preferences

Related Items

Truncated leximin solutions, Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments, Repeated bargaining with reference-dependent preferences, Bargaining with revoking costs, Alternating offers bargaining with loss aversion, Alternating-offer bargaining with endogenous commitment, Bargaining, reference points, and limited influence, Commitment in alternating offers bargaining, Multi-lateral strategic bargaining without stationarity, Expected utility versus cumulative prospect theory in an evolutionary model of bargaining, Subgame perfect equilibrium in the Rubinstein bargaining game with loss aversion, WAGE NEGOTIATION UNDER GOOD FAITH BARGAINING

Cites Work

• A game-theoretic analysis of bargaining with reputations
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• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• Equilibrium in Justifiable Strategies: A Model of Reason-based Choice in Extensive-form Games