Contribute once! Full efficiency in a dynamic contribution game

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.07.011MaRDI QIDQ2206810zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tomoya Tajika

Publication date 26 October 2020

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.07.011

zbMATH Keywords

contribute oncedynamic contribution gameefficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Public goods (91B18)

Recommendations

• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
• Public subscription and private contributions
• Noncooperative dynamic contribution to a public project
• Noncooperative dynamic contribution to a public project

Cites work

• Achievable outcomes of dynamic contribution games
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Joint Projects without Commitment
• On the endogeneity of Cournot--Nash and Stackelberg equilibria: games of accumulation
• Projects and team dynamics
• Voluntary contributions to a joint project with asymmetric agents.

Cited in

(10)

• Efficiency in a forced contribution threshold public good game
• A private contributions game for joint replenishment
• Voting on tricky questions
• Contribution games with asymmetric agents
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2131734 (Why is no real title available?)
• Noncooperative dynamic contribution to a public project
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• Achievable outcomes of dynamic contribution games
• Noncooperative dynamic contribution to a public project
• Efficient public good provision between and within groups

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