Committee Design with Endogenous Information
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Recommendations
- Voting with public information
- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- First and second best voting rules in committees
- Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
- When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives
Cited in
(84)- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- Reliability of information aggregation with regional biases: A note
- The price of `one person, one vote'
- Pivotal persuasion
- Voting with public information
- Committee decisions with partisans and side-transfers
- Information efficiency and majority decisions
- Majority rule or delegation? A normal noise case
- Deliberation, disclosure of information, and voting
- The organization of expertise in the presence of communication
- Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice
- Efficient voting with penalties
- Optimal delay in committees
- When voters like to be right : an analysis of the Condorcet jury theorem with mixed motives
- Information disclosure with many alternatives
- Voting on tricky questions
- A nonspeculation theorem with an application to committee design
- Non-congruent views about signal precision in collective decisions
- Pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy: costly juror effort and free riding
- Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: a theoretical investigation
- Voting in three-alternative committees: an experiment
- Information acquisition and provision in school choice: an experimental study
- On the costly voting model: the mean rule
- Should straw polls be banned?
- Premise-based versus outcome-based information aggregation
- Deliberative voting
- First and second best voting rules in committees
- Public information and social choice
- Size and distributional uncertainty, public information and the information paradox
- A comment on Koh's ``The optimal design of fallible organizations: invariance of optimal decision criterion and uniqueness of hierarchy and polyarchy structures
- On the drawbacks of large committees
- Information aggregation with a continuum of types
- Information acquisition in committees
- Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?
- Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study
- Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- The optimal design of fallible organizations: invariance of optimal decision criterion and uniqueness of hierarchy and polyarchy structures
- Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
- Subgroup deliberation and voting
- Jury voting without objective probability
- The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition
- The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study
- Learning while voting: determinants of collective experimentation
- Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms
- Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives
- Voting in small committees
- Eliciting information from a committee
- Information acquisition and transparency in committees
- Specialization and partisanship in committee search
- Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1
- Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent
- An incentive-compatible Condorcet jury theorem
- Unanimous rules in the laboratory
- Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence
- Committee design with endogenous participation
- Learning aversion and voting rules in collective decision making
- Agenda control as a cheap talk game: theory and experiments with storable votes
- Information aggregation, growth, and franchise extension with applications to female enfranchisement and inequality
- Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
- The ``desire to conform and dynamic search by a committee
- Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation
- Conservativeness in jury decision-making
- Information acquisition and full surplus extraction
- Optimal voting rules for two-member tenure committees
- Full information equivalence in large elections
- Voting to persuade
- Can compulsory voting reduce information acquisition?
- Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
- The veil of public ignorance
- When can an outsider bribe voters one by one at a negligible cost?
- Aggregation of antagonistic contingent preferences: when is it possible?
- Implementer selection in committee decision: the trade-off between transparency and committee size
- Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: Is turnout too high or too low?
- Optimal jury design for homogeneous juries with correlated votes
- Information sharing in democratic mechanisms
- The importance of expertise in group decisions
- Rational ignorance and voting behavior
- Consistency and communication in committees
- Expert advice to a voting body
- Continuous decisions by a committee: median versus average mechanisms
- Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees
- The swing voter's curse with adversarial preferences
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