Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives

DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0784-5zbMATH Open1297.91062OpenAlexW1998954346MaRDI QIDQ404769FDOQ404769

Authors: Johanna M. M. Goertz 

Publication date: 4 September 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0784-5

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
• On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Jury theorems with multiple alternatives
• Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
• Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters
• Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting

Cited In (5)

• (A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting
• Democracy for polarized committees: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants
• Voting in three-alternative committees: an experiment
• Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
• Voting on tricky questions

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