Inefficient committees: small elections with three alternatives

DOI10.1007/S00355-013-0784-5MaRDI QIDQ404769zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Johanna M. M. Goertz

Publication date 4 September 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-013-0784-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Information aggregation in multicandidate elections under plurality rule and runoff voting
• Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
• Jury theorems with multiple alternatives
• On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
• One person, many votes: divided majority and information aggregation
• Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Simple plurality versus plurality runoff with privately informed voters
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information

Cited in

(7)

• (A)symmetric equilibria and adaptive learning dynamics in small-committee voting
• Democracy for polarized committees: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants
• Voting in small committees
• Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees
• Voting on tricky questions
• Voting in three-alternative committees: an experiment
• A Condorcet jury theorem for large \textit{Poisson} elections with multiple alternatives

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