Democracy for polarized committees: the tale of Blotto's lieutenants

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.009zbMath1414.91124OpenAlexW2336765454WikidataQ56873873 ScholiaQ56873873MaRDI QIDQ1682727

Jean-François Laslier, Alessandra Casella, Antonin Macé

Publication date: 5 December 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w22231.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

polarizationcommitteesvotingstorable votesColonel Blottotyranny of majority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Voting theory (91B12) Positional games (pursuit and evasion, etc.) (91A24) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

\(N\)-dimensional Blotto game with heterogeneous battlefield values ⋮ Buying supermajorities in the lab

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games
• Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum Colonel Blotto games
• Why not proportional?
• An experimental study of storable votes
• An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games
• Discrete Colonel Blotto and general lotto games
• Storable votes
• The Colonel Blotto game
• The Tennis Coach Problem: A Game-Theoretic and Experimental Study
• A Colonel Blotto Gladiator Game
• Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision

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