Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2437813
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.008zbMath1282.91093MaRDI QIDQ2437813
Publication date: 13 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.008
91B12: Voting theory
Related Items
Voluntary voting: costs and benefits, Pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy: costly juror effort and free riding, Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers, The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
- Rational ignorance and voting behavior
- Condorcet's jury theorem in light of de Finetti's theorem. Majority-rule voting with correlated votes
- Condorcet's jury theorem, dependency among jurors
- Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Stay away from fair coins: a Condorcet jury theorem
- Rational choice and the Condorcet jury theorem
- Deliberative voting
- When is Condorcet's jury theorem valid?
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
- Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
- A Measure of Asymptotic Efficiency for Tests of a Hypothesis Based on the sum of Observations