Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.008zbMath1282.91093OpenAlexW3121297912MaRDI QIDQ2437813

Matteo Triossi

Publication date: 13 March 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.07.008

zbMATH Keywords

heterogeneityendogenous information acquisitionCondorcet's jury theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items

The Condorcet jury theorem with information acquisition ⋮ Voluntary voting: costs and benefits ⋮ Pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy: costly juror effort and free riding ⋮ Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers

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