Voting with public information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.011zbMath1419.91253OpenAlexW3122272368WikidataQ128760610 ScholiaQ128760610MaRDI QIDQ1735780

Shuo Liu

Publication date: 29 March 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.uzh.ch/static/wp/econwp191.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

collective decision-makingstrategic votingpublic informationinformation disclosurecommittee designoptimal voting rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items

Public information: relevance or salience?, The swing voter's curse in social networks

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