Information sharing in democratic mechanisms

DOI10.1007/S00182-020-00708-2zbMATH Open1447.91035OpenAlexW3010052562MaRDI QIDQ776856FDOQ776856

Authors: Volker Britz, Hans Gersbach 

Publication date: 13 July 2020

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-020-00708-2

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zbMATH Keywords

samplingvotinginformation sharingpublic goodspollingdemocratic mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Public goods (91B18) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Strategic Information Transmission
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Private polling in elections and voter welfare
• Welfare reducing polls
• Experimentation in federal systems
• Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework
• Public information and electoral bias
• Critical decisions and constitutional rules
• Tax rules
• Robustly coalition-proof incentive mechanisms for public good provision are voting mechanisms and vice versa

Cited In (6)

• Masked observation for majority-based control of a democratic progress model in the framework of discrete event systems
• On the limits of democracy
• Power to youth: designing democracy for long-term well-being
• Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision
• On robust constitution design
• Information transmission and voting

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