Critical decisions and constitutional rules

DOI10.1007/S00355-010-0492-3zbMATH Open1235.91151OpenAlexW2035835250MaRDI QIDQ647553FDOQ647553

Authors: Toke S. Aidt, Francesco Giovannoni 

Publication date: 23 November 2011

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research-files/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe0523.pdf

Recommendations

• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Representation of constitutions under incomplete information
• Fiscal constitutions
• Tax rules
• Constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

Cites Work

• Storable votes
• Elections, governments, and parliaments in proportional representation systems
• Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
• Private provision of discrete public goods
• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Endogenous Political Institutions
• Voting on Majority Rules
• Dividing resources by flexible majority rules
• Foundations of Incomplete Contracts

Cited In (5)

• Choosing How to Choose: Self-Stable Majority Rules and Constitutions
• Fiscal constitutions
• Constitutional rules of exclusion in jurisdiction formation
• Information sharing in democratic mechanisms
• In the beginning there were \(n\) agents: founding and amending a constitution

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