Legitimacy of mechanisms for public good provision

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2016.07.041zbMath1396.91184OpenAlexW2488801146MaRDI QIDQ1668517

Pierre C. Boyer, Elisabeth Schulte, Yukio Koriyama

Publication date: 29 August 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.07.041

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationdeliberationpublic goodex post efficiency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18)

Cites Work

• Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem
• Robustly Coalition-Proof Incentive Mechanisms for Public Good Provision are Voting Mechanisms and Vice Versa: TABLE 1
• Efficiency, Welfare, and Political Competition *
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