The veil of public ignorance
From MaRDI portal
Publication:705834
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.009zbMath1079.91016MaRDI QIDQ705834
Publication date: 16 February 2005
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2003.12.009
Asymmetric information; Bayesian aggregation; Interim Pareto efficiency; Utilitarianism; Veil of ignorance
91B12: Voting theory
Related Items
Egalitarian equivalence under asymmetric information, Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors, PARETO EFFICIENCY AND WEIGHTED MAJORITY RULES
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