Unanimous rules in the laboratory

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2016.12.001zbMath1409.91069OpenAlexW2253683008MaRDI QIDQ523479

Frédéric Malherbe, Laurent Bouton, Aniol Llorente-Saguer

Publication date: 21 April 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w21943.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

information aggregationlaboratory experimentsunanimity ruleveto powerframingconstructive abstention

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (4)

Truth-revealing voting rules for large populations ⋮ Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments ⋮ Conformity and truthful voting under different voting rules ⋮ Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate?

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• ORSEE

Cites Work

• The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study
• Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Veto power in committees: An experimental study
• Population uncertainty and Poisson games
• Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments
• Limited attention and status quo bias
• Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study
• An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation
• The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
• The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses
• Committee Design with Endogenous Information

This page was built for publication: Unanimous rules in the laboratory