Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.03.009zbMATH Open1393.91050OpenAlexW2604785256MaRDI QIDQ2013342FDOQ2013342

Authors: Friederike Mengel, Javier Rivas 

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://opus.bath.ac.uk/55057/1/Common_value_elections_with_private_information_and_informative_priors.pdf

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zbMATH Keywords

private informationCondorcet jury theoremswing voter's cursevoter turnoutcommon value elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Cites Work

• The swing voter's curse in the laboratory
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
• Large Poisson games
• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
• First and second best voting rules in committees
• Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses

Cited In (9)

• Aggregating information by voting: the wisdom of the experts versus the wisdom of the masses
• Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory
• Conservativeness in jury decision-making
• Costly information acquisition. Is it better to toss a coin?
• Against all odds: tentative steps toward efficient information sharing in groups
• Voting in three-alternative committees: an experiment
• A unified analysis of rational voting with private values and group-specific costs
• The fragility of information aggregation in large elections
• Unanimous rules in the laboratory

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

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