Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.03.009zbMath1393.91050OpenAlexW2604785256MaRDI QIDQ2013342

Javier Rivas, Friederike Mengel

Publication date: 17 August 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://opus.bath.ac.uk/55057/1/Common_value_elections_with_private_information_and_informative_priors.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

private informationCondorcet jury theoremswing voter's cursevoter turnoutcommon value elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

Conservativeness in jury decision-making ⋮ Against all odds: tentative steps toward efficient information sharing in groups ⋮ Unanimous rules in the laboratory ⋮ Stress-testing the runoff rule in the laboratory

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees
• Voluntary voting: costs and benefits
• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Extended Poisson games and the Condorcet jury theorem
• Large Poisson games
• First and second best voting rules in committees
• Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
• Would rational voters acquire costly information?
• Informative voting and condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of types
• The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses

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