Abstention, ideology and information acquisition
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Publication:2447051
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.10.006zbMath1285.91036OpenAlexW2041285782MaRDI QIDQ2447051
Publication date: 23 April 2014
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://repository.essex.ac.uk/7450/1/Abstention.pdf
Related Items (9)
The curse of uninformed voting: an experimental study ⋮ Abstention and informedness in nonpartisan elections ⋮ The price of `one person, one vote' ⋮ Political rents and voter information in search equilibrium ⋮ Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence ⋮ Voluntary voting: costs and benefits ⋮ Common value elections with private information and informative priors: theory and experiments ⋮ Pretrial beliefs and verdict accuracy: costly juror effort and free riding ⋮ Appointed learning for the common good: optimal committee size and monetary transfers
Cites Work
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- A signaling model of repeated elections
- Rational ignorance and voting behavior
- Optimal voting schemes with costly information acquisition
- Information acquisition in committees
- Would rational voters acquire costly information?
- The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory
- Optimal Statistical Decisions
- Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
- Aggregating Information by Voting: The Wisdom of the Experts versus the Wisdom of the Masses
- Committee Design with Endogenous Information
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