Ex-post individually rational Bayesian persuasion

DOI10.1007/978-3-032-08560-3_21MaRDI QIDQ7285582zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Jiahao Zhang, Shuran Zheng, Renato Paes Leme, Zhiwei Steven Wu

Publication date 19 June 2026

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-08560-3_21

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Internet topics (68M11) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites work

• Bayesian persuasion under partial commitment
• Bayesian persuasion with costly messages
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The value of mediated communication
• Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions

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