Certification design with common values

DOI10.3982/ECTA21653MaRDI QIDQ6980189zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Andreas Asseyer

Publication date 22 May 2025

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA21653

zbMATH Keywords

disclosurestrategic information transmissioncertificationinformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Systems theory; control (93-XX)

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
• A study in the pragmatics of persuasion: a game theoretical approach
• Disclosure and choice
• Economic Comparability of Information Systems
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
• How to sell hard information
• Information transmission in voluntary disclosure games
• Mechanisms with evidence: commitment and robustness
• Microeconomic theory
• Price discrimination through communication
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values

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