Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2394MaRDI QIDQ1268574zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lu Hong

Publication date 5 May 1999

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2394

zbMATH Keywords

endowment conditionexchange economyfeasible Bayesian implementationfeasible Nash implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• Bayesian Implementation
• Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information
• Implementation in differential information economies
• Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Manipulating Lindahl equilibrium via endowments
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Manipulation via Endowments
• Nash implementation in production economies
• Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
• Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Cited in

(10)

• The endowment game when \(n = 2\)
• Bayesian monotonicity with side payments
• Bayesian implementation with verifiable information
• Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent preferences and feasible sets
• Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments
• Bayesian Implementation
• Implementation theory
• Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent
• Safe implementation
• A characterization of optimal feasible tax mechanism

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