Feasible and Continuous Implementation
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Recommendations
- Instability in the implementation of Walrasian allocations
- Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
- Nash implementation with an infinite-dimensional trade space
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
- Existence of equilibrium for Walrasian endowment games
Cited in
(42)- Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer
- Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
- Existence of equilibrium for Walrasian endowment games
- Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication
- Continuous implementation in economies with incomplete information
- Allocation of resources in a divisionalized firm
- Virtual implementation in incomplete information environments with infinite alternatives and types
- Efficiency and imperfect competition with incomplete markets.
- Incentive mechanism design for production economies with both private and public ownerships
- Natural implementation with semi-responsible agents in pure exchange economies
- Privacy in implementation
- Continuous selections from the Pareto correspondence and non-manipulability in exchange economies
- Incentives and competitive allocations in exchange economies with incomplete markets
- Consistent collusion-proofness and correlation in exchange economies.
- Nash implementation in production economies
- Weak group strategy-proof and queue-efficient mechanisms for the queueing problem with multiple machines
- Nash-implementation of competitive equilibria via a bounded mechanism
- Cost sharing: Efficiency and implementation
- Continuous implementation with direct revelation mechanisms
- The evolution of monetary equilibrium
- Implementation of marginal cost pricing equilibrium allocations with transfers in economies with increasing returns to scale
- Divide-and-permute
- Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem
- Implementation in production economies with increasing returns
- Equity and the Vickrey allocation rule on general preference domains
- Implementation with partial provability
- Implementation with evidence
- Markets, correlation, and regret-matching
- A dynamic non-direct implementation mechanism for interdependent value problems
- The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation
- Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge
- Preference manipulations lead to the uniform rule
- Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
- Safe implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
- Safe implementation
- Robust implementation with peer mechanisms and evidence
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with a message space of minimal dimension
- A note on allocations attainable through Nash equilibria
- Completely feasible and continuous implementation of the Lindahl correspondence with any number of goods
- Credible implementation
- Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities
- Implementation of Pareto efficient allocations
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