Existence of equilibrium for Walrasian endowment games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90097-3MaRDI QIDQ1068678zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Zvi Safra

Publication date 1985

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/275376/files/TEL-AVIV-FSWP-056.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

competitive equilibriumendowment manipulationexchange economyexistence of Nash equilibriafinitely many playerssequences of exchange economies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Review text

Suppose that, in an exchange economy, the Walrasian prices and the corresponding equilibrium allocations are calculated with respect to the data declared by the traders. These data are: traders' initial endowments and their preferences. It is well known [\textit{L. Hurwicz}, Decision Organization, Vol. in Honor of Jacob Marschak, Studies Math. Managerial Economics 12, 297-236 (1972; Zbl 0254.90009) or \textit{A. Postlewaite}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 46, 255-262 (1979; Zbl 0409.90014)] that traders may gain by declaring the data different from the true ones. The reviewed paper studies the game with finitely many players in which players- traders' strategies are just declarations of their endowments, generally (though not necessarily) not exceeding the true endowments; special emphasis is given to the existence of Nash equilibria in such games. In particular, the author considers sequences of exchange economies \(E_ k\) with finitely many traders, tending to an exchange economy E with a continuum of traders and investigates the assumptions guaranteeing that a competitive equilibrium for E is a limit of a sequence of Nash equilibria for \(E_ k\), or vice versa.

Recommendations

• Limit properties of equilibrium allocations of Walrasian strategic games
• Feasible and Continuous Implementation
• Sequential Bargaining as a Noncooperative Foundation for Walrasian Equilibrium
• The market game: Existence and structure of equilibrium
• Walrasian analysis via two-player games

Cites work

• Economies with a Finite Set of Equilibria
• Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3866998 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3272330 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3402334 (Why is no real title available?)
• Manipulation via Endowments
• The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
• The limit points of monopolistic competition

Cited in

(10)

• Walrasian analysis via two-player games
• Endogenously determined price-setting monopoly in an exchange economy
• Endogenous endowments and equilibrium starvation in a Walrasian economy
• Nash-Walras equilibria
• Household formation and markets
• STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS
• Feasible and Continuous Implementation
• Reaching Cournot-Walras equilibrium
• Equilibrium allocations of endowment-pretension games in public good economies
• Limit properties of equilibrium allocations of Walrasian strategic games

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