Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.011zbMath1330.91090OpenAlexW2091306456MaRDI QIDQ894019

David Wettstein, Yuan Ju, P. E. M. Borm

Publication date: 23 November 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.011

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingimplementationexternalitiesbidding mechanismpartition function form gamerational belief Shapley value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value ⋮ Cooperative concurrent games ⋮ Coalition formation in games with externalities ⋮ Marginality and convexity in partition function form games ⋮ A dynamic bargaining game with externalities ⋮ Bargaining with costly competition for the right to propose ⋮ Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games

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