Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2015.01.011zbMATH Open1330.91090OpenAlexW2091306456MaRDI QIDQ894019FDOQ894019
Authors: Yuan Ju, David Wettstein, Peter Borm
Publication date: 23 November 2015
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.01.011
Recommendations
- The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure
- Backward Induction Foundations of the Shapley Value
- Nash bargaining solution under externalities
- Games with externalities: games in coalition configuration function form
- Balanced externalities and the Shapley value
bargainingimplementationexternalitiesbidding mechanismpartition function form gamerational belief Shapley value
Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
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Cited In (14)
- A dynamic bargaining game with externalities
- Coalitional bargaining games: a new concept of value and coalition formation
- Marginality and convexity in partition function form games
- Dynamics and rationality in ordered externality games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value
- Cooperative concurrent games
- The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions
- Bargaining with costly competition for the right to propose
- Nash bargaining solution under externalities
- Expectation formation rules and the core of partition function games
- COALITION BARGAINING IN REPEATED GAMES
- Efficient coalitional bargaining with noncontingent offers
- Coalition formation in games with externalities
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