Coalition formation with boundedly rational agents
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Recommendations
- Coalition formation with heterogeneous agents
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7038560
- Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities
Cited in
(14)- On a market for coalitions with indivisible agents and lotteries
- Coalition formation as a dynamic process.
- Rational instability in the natural coalition forming
- Dynamics in matching and coalition formation games with structural constraints
- Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements in a Cournot setting
- Coalition formation with heterogeneous agents
- Coalition formation with learning from predecessors: a case of dynamic positive externality
- The formation of adaptive coalitions
- A dynamic game of coalition formation under ambiguity
- Coalition formation processes with belief revision among bounded-rational self-interested agents
- Coalition formation in social environments with logic-based agents1
- The bargaining set and coalition formation
- Coalition formation problems with externalities
- Coalitions under a competition mechanism of resource allocation
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