Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements in a Cournot setting
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Publication:2501069
DOI10.1007/s00182-006-0017-6zbMath1118.91008MaRDI QIDQ2501069
David Pérez-Castrillo, Nicolás Porteiro, Inés Macho-Stadler
Publication date: 4 September 2006
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/171296
91A12: Cooperative games
Related Items
STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES UNDER RESTRICTED COALITIONAL CHANGES, Coalition formation in games with externalities, Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value, Coalition formation in collaborative production and transportation with competing firms
Cites Work
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- Equilibrium binding agreements
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Coalitions, agreements and efficiency
- Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
- The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition
- Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
- A Theory of Gradual Coalition Formation