The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition
DOI10.2307/2937796zbMATH Open0714.90009OpenAlexW1538409113MaRDI QIDQ3200846FDOQ3200846
Authors: Israel Zang, Morton I. Kamien
Publication date: 1990
Published in: The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/754.pdf
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homogeneous product industrypartial monopolizationsubgame perfect pure strategy Nash equilibriathree-stage noncooperative games
Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cited In (26)
- Competitively cost advantageous mergers and monopolization
- Monopolizing Violence and Consolidating Power*
- Spatial competition between shopping centers
- Endogeneous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard
- Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements in a Cournot setting
- On the effects of mergers on equilibrium outcomes in a common property renewable asset oligopoly
- The dynamics of mergers and acquisitions in oligopolistic industries
- Divide and conquer. On the profitability of forming independent rival divisions
- Mergers, multiperiod Cournot competition, and Coasian dynamics
- Revenue royalties
- Capability accumulation and conglomeratization in the information age
- Mergers and the importance of fitting well
- How bad is the merger paradox?
- How bad is the merger paradox?
- On the inefficiency of merger control
- Stable coalition structures with externalities
- On the competitive effects of divisionalization
- VON NEUMANN AND MORGENSTERN STABLE SETS IN A COURNOT MERGER SYSTEM
- When to merge with a lower quality producer?
- Globalization and profitability of cross-border mergers and acquisitions
- BARGAINING FAILURES AND MERGER POLICY
- Prediction and prevention of disproportionally dominant agents in complex networks
- Do small players undermine cooperation in asymmetric games?
- Sequential mergers and delayed monopolization in triopoly
- The insiders' dilemma: An experiment on merger formation
- Advantageous symmetric cross-ownership and mergers
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