The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition

DOI10.2307/2937796MaRDI QIDQ3200846zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Israel Zang, Morton I. Kamien

Publication date 1990

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/754.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

homogeneous product industrypartial monopolizationsubgame perfect pure strategy Nash equilibriathree-stage noncooperative games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

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Cited in

(26)

• Advantageous symmetric cross-ownership and mergers
• How bad is the merger paradox?
• How bad is the merger paradox?
• Competitively cost advantageous mergers and monopolization
• Mergers and the importance of fitting well
• Divide and conquer. On the profitability of forming independent rival divisions
• The dynamics of mergers and acquisitions in oligopolistic industries
• On the inefficiency of merger control
• Do small players undermine cooperation in asymmetric games?
• Sequential mergers and delayed monopolization in triopoly
• Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements in a Cournot setting
• Revenue royalties
• The insiders' dilemma: An experiment on merger formation
• Mergers, multiperiod Cournot competition, and Coasian dynamics
• On the effects of mergers on equilibrium outcomes in a common property renewable asset oligopoly
• On the competitive effects of divisionalization
• Bargaining failures and merger policy
• Monopolizing Violence and Consolidating Power*
• Stable coalition structures with externalities
• Prediction and prevention of disproportionally dominant agents in complex networks
• Spatial competition between shopping centers
• Capability accumulation and conglomeratization in the information age
• Endogeneous formation of competing partnerships with moral hazard
• When to merge with a lower quality producer?
• VON NEUMANN AND MORGENSTERN STABLE SETS IN A COURNOT MERGER SYSTEM
• Globalization and profitability of cross-border mergers and acquisitions

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