The bargaining set and coalition formation

DOI10.1111/ijet.12320zbMath1530.91229OpenAlexW3184694722MaRDI QIDQ6074885

Ken-Ichi Shimomura

Publication date: 19 October 2023

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://www.rieb.kobe-u.ac.jp/academic/ra/dp/English/DP2021-15.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

bargaining setcoalition structurenontransferable utility gamerestrictive non-crossing condition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Existence of bargaining sets for cooperative games with fuzzy payoffs ⋮ Fairness and formation rules of coalitions

Cites Work

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• Weakening transferable utility: the case of non-intersecting Pareto curves
• An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
• An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set
• A non-weakly balanced game with non-empty bargaining set
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• A new bargaining set of an \(N\)-person game and endogenous coalition formation
• Quasi-cores in bargaining sets
• An existence theorem for a bargaining set
• A Core Existence Theorem for Games Without Ordered Preferences
• The Core of an N Person Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
• Existence theorem for the bargaining set 𝑀₁^{(𝑖)}

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