Fairness and formation rules of coalitions

DOI10.1111/IJET.12385OpenAlexW4383906897MaRDI QIDQ6180347FDOQ6180347

Marialaura Pesce, Chiara Donnini

Publication date: 19 January 2024

Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12385

zbMATH Keywords

fairnesscoalition formation ruleequal-income competitive equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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• Fair allocations in large economies with unequal production skills

Cited In (1)

• Social equity in international environmental agreements

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