Fairness and formation rules of coalitions
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Publication:6180347
DOI10.1111/ijet.12385OpenAlexW4383906897MaRDI QIDQ6180347
Marialaura Pesce, Chiara Donnini
Publication date: 19 January 2024
Published in: International Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/ijet.12385
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