Social equity in international environmental agreements

DOI10.1007/S10898-024-01368-2MaRDI QIDQ6607030zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Chiara Donnini, Armando Sacco

Publication date 17 September 2024

Published in Journal of Global Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

zbMATH Keywords

non-cooperative gamesenvy-freenessinternational environmental agreementssocial equity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Noncooperative games (91A10) 2-person games (91A05)

Recommendations

• International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
• The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
• Dynamic regularization of self-enforcing international environmental agreement in the game of heterogeneous players
• On the existence of efficient, individually rational, and fair environmental agreements
• Dynamic regularization of self-enforcing international environmental agreement in the game of heterogeneous players

Cites work

• Absence of envy among ``neighbors can be enough
• Adaptation and the allocation of pollution reduction costs
• Adapting to climate change: is cooperation good for the environment?
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• Cooperation in pollution control problems via evolutionary variational inequalities
• Divide-and-permute
• Emergent collaboration in social purpose games
• Evolutionary farsightedness in international environmental agreements
• Fairness and formation rules of coalitions
• Fairness and fuzzy coalitions
• Great fish war with moratorium
• Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
• Impact of social externalities on the formation of an international environmental agreement: an exploratory analysis
• Local envy-freeness and equal-income Walrasian allocations
• Local strict envy-freeness in large economies
• On fairness of equilibria in economies with differential information
• On the existence of fair allocations
• Pitfalls in the theory of fairness
• Strict fairness of equilibria in asymmetric information economies and mixed markets
• Strictly fair allocations in large exchange economies
• The impact of foresight in a transboundary pollution game

Cited in

(1)

• Environmental damage reduction: when countries face conflicting objectives

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