Dynamic regularization of self-enforcing international environmental agreement in the game of heterogeneous players

zbMATH Open1197.91157MaRDI QIDQ3582287FDOQ3582287

Authors: Maria Dementieva, Yulia Pavlova, Viktor V. Zakharov 

Publication date: 2 September 2010

Recommendations

• Dynamic regularization of self-enforcing international environmental agreement in the game of heterogeneous players
• The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
• International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
• Social norms for the stability of international enviromental agreements
• Stable international environmental agreements: large coalitions that achieve little

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cited In (7)

• The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
• Reevaluation and renegotiation of climate change coalitions-a sequential closed-loop game approach
• Dynamic regularization of self-enforcing international environmental agreement in the game of heterogeneous players
• Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with third-party organizations: initial payment, technological development, and refunding
• Social equity in international environmental agreements
• PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION
• Social norms for the stability of international enviromental agreements

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