Dynamic regularization of self-enforcing international environmental agreement in the game of heterogeneous players
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Publication:3582287
Recommendations
- Dynamic regularization of self-enforcing international environmental agreement in the game of heterogeneous players
- The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
- International environmental agreements with asymmetric countries
- Social norms for the stability of international enviromental agreements
- Stable international environmental agreements: large coalitions that achieve little
Cited in
(7)- The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection with asymmetric countries
- Reevaluation and renegotiation of climate change coalitions-a sequential closed-loop game approach
- Dynamic regularization of self-enforcing international environmental agreement in the game of heterogeneous players
- Self-enforcing international environmental agreements with third-party organizations: initial payment, technological development, and refunding
- Social equity in international environmental agreements
- PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF TIMING AND REGULATION
- Social norms for the stability of international enviromental agreements
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