Bargaining sets with small coalitions
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We study two alternative definitions of the bargaining set in large (atomless) economies; the local bargaining set by Mas-Colell (1989) and the global bargaining set by Vind (1992). We alter these definitions to limit the size of the permitted size of the involved coalitions. It turns out that the local bargaining set becomes very large, whereas the global bargaining set is unaltered.
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Cites work
Cited in
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