An implementation of the Owen value.
The authors consider the Owen value for TU games with coalition structure. For such a game some new noncooperative game is constructed, called the coalitional bidding mechanism (CBM) where the players make bids and offers in several rounds. It is proved that the Owen value coincides with some subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) outcome of CBM, but in general, the SPNE outcome does not have to be the Owen value. The second obtained result says that the converse relation holds when the behavior of the players is restricted or the considered game is strictly superadditive. The paper generalizes the earlier result of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein related to the Shapley value.
- Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- The Shapley value, the Owen value, and the veil of ignorance
- Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
- A bargaining approach to the Owen value and the Nash solution with coalition structure
- Bargaining and Value
- Bargaining Foundations of Shapely Value
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3614541 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Potential, Value, and Consistency
- The consistency and potential for values of games with coalition structure
- The principle of balanced contributions and hierarchies of cooperation
- Implementation of weighted values in hierarchical and horizontal cooperation structures
- Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach
- A note on the group bargaining solution
- Choosing wisely: The natural multi-bidding mechanism
- Realizing fair outcomes in minimum cost spanning tree problems through non-cooperative mechanisms
- Owen's coalitional value and aircraft landing fees
- The Harsanyi paradox and the ``right to talk in bargaining among coalitions
- Bidding against a buyout: implementing the Shapley value and the equal surplus value
- Sampling methods to estimate the Banzhaf-Owen value
- Smooth multibidding mechanisms
- A strategic implementation of the average tree solution for cycle-free graph games
- Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems
- A bargaining approach to the Owen value and the Nash solution with coalition structure
- A simple bargaining procedure for the Myerson value
- The collective value: a new solution for games with coalition structures
- Bargaining and membership
- Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
- Shapley, Owen and Aumann-Dreze values in a patrolling game with coalition structure
- Bidding with coalitional externalities: a strategic approach to partition function form games
- Implementation of the levels structure value
- A coalitional compromised solution for cooperative games
- Efficient bidding with externalities
- Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities
- Forming coalitions and the Shapley NTU value
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