Shapley, Owen and Aumann-Dreze values in a patrolling game with coalition structure

DOI10.1134/S0005117917100113MaRDI QIDQ683464zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Juan-Miguel Gracia

Publication date 6 February 2018

Published in Automation and Remote Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1134/s0005117917100113

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuecoalition structureOwen valuecooperative approachpatrolling gameAumann-Drèze value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Positional games (pursuit and evasion, etc.) (91A24)

Recommendations

• Shapley, Owen, and the Aumann-Dreze values in a patrolling game with coalition structure
• A value for cooperative games with levels structure of cooperation
• Values and potential of games with cooperation structure
• The Shapley value, the Owen value, and the veil of ignorance
• On the relationship between Shapley and Owen values

Cites work

• A new axiomatization of the Owen value for games with coalition structures
• A note on the Owen value for glove games
• An implementation of the Owen value.
• Coalition structure stability in a model of bank cooperation
• Optimal search and ambush for a hider who can escape the search region
• Owen coalitional value without additivity axiom
• Search games and other applications of game theory

Cited in

(3)

• Owen-stable coalition partitions in games with vector payoffs
• Shapley, Owen, and the Aumann-Dreze values in a patrolling game with coalition structure
• Owen-stable coalition partitions in games with vector payoffs

This page was built for publication: Shapley, Owen and Aumann-Dreze values in a patrolling game with coalition structure

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q683464)