Coalition structure stability in a model of bank cooperation

zbMATH Open1273.91077MaRDI QIDQ2853733FDOQ2853733

Elena M. Parilina, Artem A. Sedakov

Publication date: 17 October 2013

Published in: Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i eë Prilozheniya (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://mathnet.ru/eng/mgta96

zbMATH Keywords

cost allocationShapley valuecoalitionstable coalitional structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cited In (8)

• Shapley, Owen and Aumann-Dreze values in a patrolling game with coalition structure
• Oligopolistic banking sector of Mongolia and polymatrix games of three players
• Two-factor DEA modeling and clustering of homogeneous firms
• Applying cooperative games with coalition structure for data clustering
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Stability in a model of interbank lending
• Model of the financial coalition in dynamics

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