Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)90011-6zbMath0823.90147MaRDI QIDQ1804379

Benny Moldovanu, Eyal Winter

Publication date: 14 May 1995

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90011-6

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formation; non-cooperative bargaining; core implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A12: Cooperative games

Related Items

Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core, Efficient coalitional bargaining with noncontingent offers, Implementation of the levels structure value, Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core, Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games, Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities, A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule, Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach, Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods, A demand adjustment process, Consistency, converse consistency, and aspirations in TU-games., An implementation of the Owen value., The recursive core for non-superadditive games

Cites Work

• Cores and large cores when population varies
• Cooperative games with large cores
• Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit
• The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
• Mechanism robustness in multilateral bargaining
• Cores of convex games
• Nonmanipulable Cores
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
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