Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(94)90011-6zbMath0823.90147OpenAlexW2126107768MaRDI QIDQ1804379

Benny Moldovanu, Eyal Winter

Publication date: 14 May 1995

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(94)90011-6

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationnon-cooperative bargainingcore implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (13)

Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core ⋮ Implementation of the recursive core for partition function form games ⋮ A demand adjustment process ⋮ Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities ⋮ Consistency, converse consistency, and aspirations in TU-games. ⋮ A non-cooperative approach to the ordinal Shapley-Shubik rule ⋮ Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core ⋮ An implementation of the Owen value. ⋮ Efficient coalitional bargaining with noncontingent offers ⋮ Implementing cooperative solution concepts: a generalized bidding approach ⋮ Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods ⋮ The recursive core for non-superadditive games ⋮ Implementation of the levels structure value

Cites Work

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• Cores and large cores when population varies
• Cooperative games with large cores
• Alternating bid bargaining with a smallest money unit
• The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
• Mechanism robustness in multilateral bargaining
• Cores of convex games
• Nonmanipulable Cores
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining

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