Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.009zbMath1258.91090OpenAlexW1576764111MaRDI QIDQ417625

Akira Okada

Publication date: 14 May 2012

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.01.009

zbMATH Keywords

signalingcoreinformation transmissionincomplete informationexchange economynon-cooperative bargaining

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (6)

Bidding rings: a bargaining approach ⋮ A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: verifiable types ⋮ Signaling, screening, and core stability ⋮ The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information ⋮ COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS ⋮ An interim core for normal form games and exchange economies with incomplete information

Cites Work

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• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining

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