COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS
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Publication:2854008
DOI10.1142/S0219198913400094zbMath1274.91043OpenAlexW3123488078MaRDI QIDQ2854008
Françoise Forges, Roberto Serrano
Publication date: 17 October 2013
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198913400094
exchange economiescooperative games with orthogonal coalitionsinformational externalitiesnoncooperative Bayesian gamesstrategic externalities
Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Trade models (91B60)
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