On the core of an economy with differential information
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Publication:1841182
DOI10.1006/jeth.2000.2673zbMath1013.91078OpenAlexW2010443788MaRDI QIDQ1841182
Ezra Einy, Benyamin Shitovitz, Diego Moreno
Publication date: 13 July 2003
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/4394
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Cites Work
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