Small Informational Size and Interim Cores of Large Quasilinear Economies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5110636
DOI10.1142/S0219198919500129zbMath1443.91200WikidataQ126865419 ScholiaQ126865419MaRDI QIDQ5110636
Yusuke Kamishiro, Roberto Serrano
Publication date: 21 May 2020
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/202603/1/1029376263.pdf
asymmetric informationinformational smallnessapproximate interim coreslarge quasilinear exchange economies
Cites Work
- Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies
- Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
- Approximate cores of games and economies with clubs.
- Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.
- Core convergence with asymmetric information
- Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
- Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies
- Information transmission in coalitional voting games
- Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information
- Incomplete information, credibility and the core
- COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS
- Equilibrium Blocking in Large Quasilinear Economies
- Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy
- Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
- The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
- Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
This page was built for publication: Small Informational Size and Interim Cores of Large Quasilinear Economies
