Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information.
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Publication:1413220
DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00128-3zbMath1124.91350OpenAlexW3125245677MaRDI QIDQ1413220
Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite
Publication date: 16 November 2003
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00128-3
Related Items
Conditional exact law of large numbers and asymmetric information economies with aggregate uncertainty ⋮ Equilibria and incentives in private information economies ⋮ The incentive compatible coarse core when information is almost complete. ⋮ Equilibrium theory under ambiguity ⋮ Small Informational Size and Interim Cores of Large Quasilinear Economies ⋮ Informational size and the incentive compatible coarse core in quasilinear economies ⋮ Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments ⋮ Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies ⋮ Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete ⋮ Core convergence with asymmetric information ⋮ Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: an analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces ⋮ Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
Cites Work
- Implementation in differential information economies
- Incomplete information, incentive compatibility, and the core
- Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
- The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects
- Informational Size and Incentive Compatibility
- Core concepts in economies where information is almost complete
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