On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information
From MaRDI portal
Publication:4531049
DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00263zbMath1020.91041OpenAlexW2258926320MaRDI QIDQ4531049
Roberto Serrano, Oscar Volij, Rajiv Vohra
Publication date: 28 May 2002
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00263
General equilibrium theory (91B50) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)
Related Items (11)
Modeling large societies: why countable additivity is necessary ⋮ Information and size of coalitions ⋮ Virtual utility and the core for games with incomplete information ⋮ Core, equilibria and incentives in large asymmetric information economies ⋮ Core convergence with asymmetric information ⋮ Market games with asymmetric information: the core ⋮ The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information ⋮ Existence of Edgeworth equilibria for economies with asymmetric information ⋮ Monopolists of scarce information and small group effectiveness in large quasilinear economies ⋮ COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS ⋮ Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey.
This page was built for publication: On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information
