Values for cooperative games with incomplete information: an eloquent example

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.004zbMath1118.91013OpenAlexW2007562081MaRDI QIDQ2577442

Geoffroy de Clippel

Publication date: 22 December 2005

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.09.004

zbMATH Keywords

virtual utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

A generalization of the Harsanyi NTU value to games with incomplete information ⋮ Employee-stock-options, production/service functions and game theory ⋮ Interim third-party selection in bargaining ⋮ On the values of Bayesian cooperative games with sidepayments ⋮ COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION: SOME OPEN PROBLEMS

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