Cores and large cores when population varies
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Cites work
- A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints
- A proof that the core of an ordinal convex game is a von Neumann- Morgenstern solution
- An Axiomatization of Harsanyi's Nontransferable Utility Solution
- Cooperative games with large cores
- Egalitarian-Equivalent Cost Sharing of a Public Good
- Fair division under joint ownership: Recent results and open problems
- How to share the cost of a public good
- Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
- The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
- The aspiration approach to predicting coalition formation and payoff distribution in sidepayment games
Cited in
(24)- Population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes for TU-games
- On cooperative games with large monotonic core
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4077005 (Why is no real title available?)
- A demand adjustment process
- On the grey obligation rules
- A note on the monotonic core
- A NOTE ON NTU CONVEXITY AND POPULATION MONOTONIC ALLOCATION SCHEMES
- Core implementation and increasing returns to scale for cooperation
- A dual description of the class of games with a population monotonic allocation scheme
- Population monotonicity and consistency in convex games: Some logical relations
- Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- New characterizations for largeness of the core
- Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
- Average monotonic cooperative games with nontransferable utility
- Double-edged population monotonicity of Walrasian equilibrium -- a note on the nature of competition
- Large cores and exactness
- ON THE SUPERMODULARITY OF HOMOGENEOUS OLIGOPOLY GAMES
- Absence-proofness: group stability beyond the core
- Largeness of the core of \(k\)-convex symmetric games
- The aggregate-monotonic core
- Monotonicity and Solidarity Axioms in Economics and Game Theory
- A note: characterizations of convex games by means of population monotonic allocation schemes
- Minimal large sets for cooperative games
- On the game-theoretic structure of public-good economies
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