Population Lorenz-monotonic allocation schemes for TU-games
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Publication:6624517
DOI10.1007/S00355-024-01538-XMaRDI QIDQ6624517FDOQ6624517
Carlos Rafels, Jesús Montes, Josep M. Izquierdo
Publication date: 25 October 2024
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Cites Work
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