Process manipulation in unique implementation

DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0712-0MaRDI QIDQ2453402zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date 6 June 2014

Published in Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2012/2012cf870.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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• Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2038846
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Cites work

• A course in game theory.
• Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Groupthink: Collective delusions in organizations and markets
• Implementation with evidence
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Promises and Partnership
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information

Cited in

(3)

• Epistemological implementation of social choice functions
• Strategies of persuasion, manipulation and propaganda: psychological and social aspects
• Honesty and epistemological implementation of social choice functions with asymmetric information

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