Process manipulation in unique implementation

DOI10.1007/S00355-012-0712-0zbMath1288.91110OpenAlexW2053783518MaRDI QIDQ2453402

Hitoshi Matsushima

Publication date: 6 June 2014

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.cirje.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/research/dp/2012/2012cf870.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

Epistemological implementation of social choice functions

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Nash implementation with partially honest individuals
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• Behavioral aspects of implementation theory
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation with evidence
• Fault Tolerant Implementation
• Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets
• Promises and Partnership

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