Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games

DOI10.1111/1468-0262.00357MaRDI QIDQ5475012zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Amparo Urbano, José E. Vila

Publication date 16 June 2006

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00357

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) 2-person games (91A05) Cryptography (94A60)

Recommendations

• Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information
• Limits on the power of cryptographic cheap talk
• Communication, computability, and common interest games
• Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
• Correlated equilibria and communication in games

Cited in

(23)

• Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibrium outcomes by ``cheap pre-play procedures
• Unmediated communication in repeated games with imperfect monitoring.
• Unmediated communication in games with complete and incomplete information.
• Computationally restricted unmediated talk under incomplete information
• Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring
• Communication scheme based on evolutionary spatial \(2 \times 2\) games
• Cheap talk in games with incomplete information.
• Sequential equilibria in Bayesian games with communication
• A detail-free mediator
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
• Correlated equilibria of two person repeated games with random signals
• The role of a-priori information in networks of rational agents
• Correlated equilibria and communication in games
• Unmediated communication with partially verifiable types
• Generalized correlated equilibrium for two-person games in extensive form with perfect information
• Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information
• Perfect implementation
• Communication, correlation and cheap-talk in games with public information
• Privately designed correlated equilibrium
• A simple model of secure public communication
• A commitment folk theorem
• A difficulty in implementing correlated equilibrium distributions
• Minority-proof cheap-talk protocol

This page was built for publication: Computational Complexity and Communication: Coordination in Two-Player Games

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5475012)