Privately designed correlated equilibrium

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2026.01.010MaRDI QIDQ6839153zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Guilherme Carmona, Krittanai Laohakunakorn

Publication date 24 March 2026

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.GEB.2026.01.010

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriuminformation designNash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Cites work

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