Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.03.001MaRDI QIDQ1036601zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alexander Guembel, Silvia Rossetto

Publication date 13 November 2009

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://publications.ut-capitole.fr/3147/1/guembel_rossetto.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

noisecommunicationcheap talkreputational concerns

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Recommendations

• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Almost fully revealing cheap talk with imperfectly informed senders
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources
• Cheap talk with coarse understanding

Cites work

• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Professional advice
• Strategic Information Transmission

Cited in

(5)

• Using cheap talk to polarize or unify a group of decision makers
• Cheap talk with coarse understanding
• Cheap talk when the receiver has uncertain information sources
• Information control in reputational cheap talk
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives

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