Lying for votes

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.07.015MaRDI QIDQ6148360zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Subhasish Dugar, Quazi Shahriar

Publication date 11 January 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.015

zbMATH Keywords

information sharinglaboratory experimentlyingvoting

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05) Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites work

• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• An experimental study of collective deliberation
• An experimental study of strategic information transmission
• Cheap talk with multiple audiences: an experimental analysis
• Communication with multiple senders: an experiment
• Competition, preference uncertainty, and jamming: a strategic communication experiment
• Credulity, lies, and costly talk
• Deliberation and Voting Rules
• Deliberative voting
• Do lies erode trust?
• Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
• Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Lies in disguise -- a theoretical analysis of cheating
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• On the Limits of Communication in Multidimensional Cheap Talk: A Comment
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling
• Reacting to unfairness: group identity and dishonest behavior
• Role of honesty in full implementation
• Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty
• Strategic communication with lying costs
• Strategic Information Transmission
• The hidden cost of bargaining: evidence from a cheating-prone marketplace
• Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
• Would I lie to you? On social preferences and lying aversion

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